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Bougainville:
Some Financial and Ownership Issues
Paul W. Quodling
A total of nineteen languages (both Austronesian and non-Austronesian
in derivation) over a land area of nine thousand square kilometers indi-
cates the fragmented social structure of Bougainville and the neighboring
Buka islands. More specifically, Douglas Oliver has described how "the
households were grouped into hamlets or villages which comprised up to
about 300 residents, which was about the upper limit to durable territorial
groupings" (1973, 68).
European influence-missionary, administrative, and entrepreneurial
-brought an end to tribal fighting and provided avenues for wider social
contact. These interactions coupled with the wider use of Pidgin as a lin-
gua franca saw the development among Bougainvilleans of a sense of com-
mon ethnic identity. This was fortified by their characteristic black skin,
which distinguishes them markedly from other Papua New Guineans, and
it is understandable that the casual observer will see Bougainvilleans as a
homogeneous people.
However, any in-depth study of the current political impasse must rec-
ognize the continuing undercurrent of parochialism that characterized the
social fragmentation of indigenous Bougainville.
Oliver brought these conflicting loyalties into balance when describing
changes in the social structure post-World War II. "Many Buins, for
example, continued to dislike Nasiois, Bukans, etc. and vice versa, but
they are nearly all united in greater dislike of their stereotypes of Chim-
bus, Sepiks, Papuans and other redskins, a feeling that inspires much of
the sentiment for secession" (1973, 202). In an environment of traditional
subsistence farming with a modest drift toward a cash economy through
agriculture, it is probable that Bougainvilleans would have accepted, per-
haps reluctantly, participation in an independent Papua New Guinea.
However, the mine developed by Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) ac-
celerated the move to a cash economy, with associated changes in the
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social structure, thus introducing economic parameters of an unprece-
dented magnitude.
Exploration in the Panguna area began in 1964. The deposits proved
low-grade by world standards, but extensive. Because of the low grade
and the company's high commitment to infrastructure, economic viability
was dependent on mounting a large-scale mining and concentration oper-
ation. Construction began in 1969, and the mine came into production in
early 1972.
Under the terms of the 1967 Bougainville Copper Agreement, the Gov-
ernment of Papua New Guinea was to obtain a 20 percent equity holding
in BCL. This was later reduced marginally by the sale of a parcel of shares,
and ownership of the company stabilized at the levels shown in Table 1.
When Papua New Guinea gained self-government in December 1973, one
of the early initiatives of the House of Assembly (which became the gov-
ernment of independent Papua New Guinea) was to call for renegotiation
of the Bougainville Copper Agreement that had been legislated in 1967,
when the country was still under Australian administration.
The resultant Mining (Bougainville Copper Agreement) Amendment
Act 1974 was to define the rights and obligations of BCL in independent
Papua New Guinea. The main variation in the 1974 agreement from the
1967 original was in taxation. However, the level of financial benefit that
was to accrue to Bougainville relative to Papua New Guinea was not
changed materially. The PNG government, as had the colonial adminis-
tration before it, held strongly that taxation was a national responsibility,
Table 1. Ownership of Bougainville Copper Limited
Owner
CRA
Public
PNG government
TOTAL
Shares (Million)
214.9
109.7
76.4
401.0
Percent
53.6
27.3
19.1
100.0
Source: BCL financial records.
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and that the distribution of funds to districts (later to become provinces)
was at the discretion of the national government.
To understand the dissent that this was to generate, it is necessary to
quantify the direct cash benefits emanating from BCL operations, and the
recipients (Table 2). In terms of the national economy, sales of the com-
pany's product have generated 40 to 50 percent of total foreign exchange;
contributions to the national budget represent some IS to 20 percent of
internally generated revenue.
Table 2. Direct Cash Benefits from BeL Operations, 1972-1989
(Million kina)
TO PNG GOVERNMENT
Income tax
Dividends
Dividend withholding tax
Pay-as-you-earn tax
Customs duty
Miscellaneous
TOTAL
TO NORTH SOLOMONS PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
Royalties (95 percent)
Taxes
Nonrenewable resource fund
TOTAL
TO LANDOWNERS
Royalties (5 percent)
Occupation and compensation
TOTAL
TO INVESTORS (NONGOVERNMENT)
Dividends
TOTAL
Source: BCL financial records.
582
166
96
120
104
10
1078
61
12
2
75
3
21
24
577
577
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Understandably, Bougainvilleans looked with chagrin at the dispropor-
tionately high level of revenue generated by their province relative to other
parts of Papua New Guinea and believed that the proportion returned to
the province in the form of government grants and services was inade-
quate.
Equally understandable was the reaction of the national administrators
who pointed out that Bougainville enjoyed a level of economic prosperity
superior to that of lesser developed areas, particularly the highland prov-
Inces.
The first major thrust toward Bougainvillean self-determination-both
political and economic-was launched in 1975, fifteen days before the
independence of Papua New Guinea was to be formalized. A declaration
of independence and a flag-raising ceremony took place on 1 September
1975, and the name North Solomons (to signify ethnic affiliations separate
from Papua New Guinea) was adopted. This independence ceremony was
followed by representations to the United Nations, with little apparent
success. A delegation to BCL management called for the redirection of
taxes payable under the Bougainville Copper Agreement to the North
Solomons, but the proposal was rejected on legal grounds.
Compromise within the PNG political system was reached in 1976 with
the introduction of the Organic Law of Provincial Government. The
North Solomons Provincial Government was the first to formalize its pro-
vincial identity under this law.
The existence of an elected government in the provincial capital,
Arawa, seemed to satisfy popular aspirations toward autonomy, and
secession ceased to be an item on the political agenda. However, the trap-
pings of provincial government were no guarantee of economic develop-
ment, and after four years the electorate was ready for a change of direc-
tion toward economic pragmatism.
Recognizing that the provincial budget was insufficient to finance
development objectives such as an improved road system, the premier
elect sought to enhance the flow of revenue direct to the province from
BCL, with particular emphasis on equity involvement and an increase in
royalty rates (by this time a precedent had been established for royalties to
flow back to the province).
The company proposed that the review of the Bougainville Copper
Agreement due later in 1981 could provide a vehicle for addressing these
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issues. As it happened, the North Solomons Provincial Government was
not represented in exploratory talks and the review, lacking tripartisan
involvement, stagnated.
In spite of the failure to obtain a greater share of Papua New Guinea's
take from BCL operations, the province was to enjoy significant economic
growth during the early I980s. This period saw provincial authorities and
company management working in close liaison to develop local involve-
ment in business opportunities that were subsidiary to mining operations.
The provincial elections of I984 saw again a major change in member-
ship of the House of Assembly and a drift in representation toward the
younger, more vocal, generation. A rift between the North Solomons Pro-
vincial Government and its investment arm, Bougainville Development
Corporation, militated against cooperation on business development
activities, and revenue enhancement took the form of more application of
sales and service taxation powers.
The next major thrust toward redistribution of the profits generated by
BCL was to come not from the provincial government but from the mem-
ber for Bougainville Region in the PNG parliament. Father John Momis,
who had held the seat since I972 and was leader of the Bougainville-domi-
nated Melanesian Alliance Party, launched his Bougainville Initiative
Fund as the base for his campaign for the I987 national elections.
The Bougainville Initiative Fund first surfaced in the form of a five-page
letter hand delivered to the managing director of BCL on 4 May I987. This
letter denounced the activities of the company and, under veiled threat of
mine closure, suggested that it pay direct to the North Solomons Provin-
cial Government an amount equal to 3 percent of gross metal values-
KI2.6 million in the context of I986 trading results.
The Bougainville Initiative inaugural letter promised that "what is pro-
posed here must come to pass. It will be the public agenda of the coming
weeks of election campaigning." A professional publicity campaign
ensured wide and eye-catching press coverage.
Understandably, the idea of an escalation in the level of funds flowing
direct from the mining operation to the province received wide provincial
acclaim, and Father Momis was reelected with resounding support. Fur-
thermore, Bougainville Initiative sentiments featured prominently in the
provincial elections that followed.
Postelection realities sharpened secession sentiments. The Bougainville
Initiative was not received with enthusiasm at the national level-under
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the existing legislation a KI2.6 million payment to the North Solomons
Provincial Government would have reduced Papua New Guinea revenue
from taxation and dividends by K7 million. Furthermore, a proposal by
BeL to discuss national and provincial funding relativities and the next
agreement review (scheduled for I988) was not taken up.
Although the political rhetoric associated with the Bougainville Initia-
tive specifically nominated the North Solomons Provincial Government as
the recipient, it highlighted the social costs borne by landowners in the
mine lease area and also, if only by inference, raised expectations within
this group of additional financial reward.
This development suggests another perspective (or range of perspec-
tives) on the social cost/ economic benefit equation. As can be expected,
opinions that are in accord on the issue of national or provincial revenue
distribution vary markedly on what constitutes an equitable distribution
within the province. On the one hand, those whose parochial interests lie
outside the mine lease area argue that benefits should not create a small
rich elite but should flow to the community at large with the responsibility
for distribution vested in the North Solomons Provincial Government. On
the other hand, villagers who have lost their land and lifestyle to the mine
see as inequitable a system whereby they are expected to pay the social
cost of others' economic benefit.
Oliver explains land tenure customs as follows:
Nearly all economically valuable land was owned corporately by matrilineages
and was passed on from one generation to the next through matrilineal ties.
. . . Although full or residual title to matrilineage land was inherited only
through women, it was held by men as well. In fact it was usually a male, the
senior male member of the lineage in terms of generation and age ... who
exercised most control over his matrilineage's land holdings. (1973,68-69)
Eugene Ogan provided an insight into the complexity of land tenure and
the imprecision surrounding usage customs. "This hierarchy is sufficiently
complex that, merely to talk of owning land is to obscure important
aspects of the situation. One is better advised to employ such terms as 'pri-
mary,' 'subsidiary' and 'derivative' rights with the qualification that even
this terminology may lead to oversimplification" (I97I, 84). In conclusion
Ogan observed that "no rights to Nasioi land are unconditionally guaran-
teed. No right possessed by an individual or group is ever absolute" (I97I,
92). These complexities of land tenure with a combination of matrilineal
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heritage, male custodianship, and diverse usage rights cannot be ex-
pressed in financial terms with any accuracy.
It is beyond the scope of this article to cover the history of landowner
compensation. However, it is pertinent to recognize the impact of dis-
agreement over the distribution of such payments on the chain of events
that led to the current crisis on Bougainville.
The evolution of the Panguna Landowners' Association (PLA) in 1979
provided a cohesive negotiating group representing landowners from mine
lease areas. This was seen at the time as a significant breakthrough,
because a total of 806 land-block "ownerships" had been identified after
searching analysis. Evidence of landowner disharmony came as a chal-
lenge to PLA leadership in late 1987, with the challenging chairperson and
secretary coming from the same kinship group. The subsequent disap-
pearance and apparent demise of the elder of that kinship group, who was
an influential member of the traditional PLA executive, would appear to
support the premise that dissatisfaction with sharing of the compensation
pie was a root cause of the breakaway movement and subsequent develop-
ments that were to disrupt mining operations.
Colin Filer has argued that it is likely that "deals done with one genera-
tion of landowners, or their leaders, will be repudiated by the next genera-
tion, regardless of the manner in which these deals are negotiated" (1990,
27). Furthermore, "the authority of these leaders within their communities
may well be undermined by the very fact of their having been party to
some previous agreement" (1990, 31).
Separate, but not necessarily dissociated, from the conflicts of kinship
was a growing mistrust in the management of the Road Mine Tailings
Lease Trust. The trust was introduced in 1980 as a means of investing
compensation payments in a manner that would provide a continuing
benefit to the community rather than short-term gain to individuals. Ironi-
cally, it was an improvement in management practices in this direction
that fueled these suspicions of mismanagement.
Where landowners had once had ready access to loans, and there had been lim-
ited if any pressure to repay them, there was now strict financial management
and very few individuals saw any direct cash income (loans) from the Road
Mine Tailings Lease Trust. (Connell 1991, 65)
Much will be written about the Bougainville political scene and no
doubt opinions will vary as to the cause of secession sentiments and mili-
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tam action. The issues are complex and interrelated and this short article
cannot cover them all. However, while social and environmental issues
will (and should) be addressed by analysts, fundamental economic consid-
erations played a major role in formulating community and provincial
attitudes. Even the Bougainville Initiative of 1987, with its vitriolic denun-
ciations of the socio-environmental effects of BCL operations, saw the
answer in terms of more money that "restores our dignity, confidence and
self reliance" rather than curtailing of mining in the future. The proposal
even suggested that "it may be possible to begin negotiations over the mor-
atorium which prevents exploration of the rich copper neighboring the
existing mine."
It is difficult to speculate on the economics of reactivating the Panguna
mine without detailed knowledge of both human and natural damage to
plant and equipment. Any such evaluation would depend first on resolu-
tion of the current political impasse, which is interwoven with conflicting
opinions on the relative benefits accruing to Papua New Guinea, Bougain-
ville, and the landowner community, in addition to providing an accepta-
ble return to investors (both past and future).
I do not seek to judge the relativities of such benefits and returns. These
must be addressed by the parties concerned, recognizing the prevailing cir-
cumstances at that time. However, when such issues are addressed it will
become apparent that a reactivated mine will be a significantly different
operation to the old BCL. Lower grades of the residual deposit, coupled
with the capital cost of refurbishing, will militate against future finan-
cial viability. Inevitably, the cash generated, and therefore the total
available for distribution, will suffer. Furthermore, economics will dic-
tate a much less benevolent operation in terms of employment, em-
ployee benefits, infrastructure, and community support than was the pre-
1989 BCL.
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